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The conventional account of wartime relations between Greece, New Zealand and Britain is 
one of unwavering solidarity in the face of appalling odds, and few would question its truth as 
a general narrative. More recent approaches, however, have opened up the cracks in this 
tripartite relationship. Martyn Brown’s Politics of Forgetting contributes to the on-going 
analysis of these rifts, demonstrating through an impressive range of scholarly evidence the 
way the political situation in Greece triggered tensions which sometimes had far-reaching 
consequences. The need to maintain morale meant that differences were pasted over; wartime 
censorship and the destruction of compromising documents helped to maintain a narrative of 
unquestioning mutual trust. But with the gradual release of some previously-classified material, 
things have begun to look rather different. 
 
Brown’s focus is on the New Zealand Official War History Project, which appeared gradually 
after the war under the general editorship of Howard Kippenberger, who along with Bernard 
Freyberg played a dominant role in commanding New Zealand forces in the Mediterranean. 
Citing the French philosopher Ernest Renan, he argues that “forgetting” is crucial to any 
narrative of nation: we usually remember what enhances an image of something honorable and 
heroic. These qualities certainly applied to New Zealand’s immediate agreement to send troops 
to defend the small Balkan nation that at the time, in 1941, appeared to be the only country 
holding out against the advancing Axis forces on the continent of Europe. But what is left out 
of this narrative are the areas of doubt and disagreement, especially in this case the sometimes 
outright disagreement on the part of New Zealanders over British policy in Greece. These 
disagreements, suppressed in the Official War History and in most subsequent accounts of the 
war, in fact could be said to represent another level of honour, or at least of ethical concern, to 
which a climate of post-colonial enquiry is more hospitable. 
 
Greece is remembered as having held a special place in New Zealand’s affections. Freyberg, 
who helped to organise commemorative ceremonies after the war, had great admiration for the 
Greeks—not so much for their military capacity, of which he had a fairly low opinion, but for 
their heroism on an individual and community level. The New Zealand-Greek bond was, as 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser put it, one of exceptional trust and friendship on account of “the 
Greek [ . . .] gallantry and self-sacrifice in sheltering our men” (80) on the run from the 
Germans after the routing of Allied forces in April- May 1941. Numerous stories survive of 
the brutal reprisals suffered by local people for failing to betray men who hadn’t managed to 
evacuate. Fraser’s awareness of the New Zealand debt to the Greek people, which led at times 
to his initiating protests to London about Foreign Office policy in Greece, makes him the hero 
of Brown’s story. Wartime conditions, however, did not allow for consistency in this 
opposition. Of particular interest to New Zealand readers of Brown’s book will be the detailed 
records of exchanges between Fraser and the military commanders as the dominion attempted 
to steer a delicate course between political and military exigencies. Using sentimental phrases 
such as that the Greeks are “enthroned in the hearts of our soldiers” (172-73), Fraser comes 
across as a man of impressive personal and political sympathies who was however often acting 
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The achievements of New Zealand forces in Greece required some elaboration in the Official 
War History to fit a tale worthy of national memory. Hopelessly out-numbered by the 
advancing German army in April 1941, Commonwealth forces, after a brave initial stand, had 
retreated south to Crete or Egypt within weeks. And on Crete itself, where the defeat was 
significantly more dramatic (671 New Zealanders killed, 967 wounded and 2,180 taken 
prisoner), things went very wrong in ways recent historians have been less reluctant to conceal. 
But Crete was a different story for other reasons, partly because this fateful battle was fought 
under Freyberg’s leadership, partly because this was the largest concentrated interaction 
between New Zealanders and Greeks, and partly because of the humanitarian outcome. From 
Crete the role played by a New Zealand platoon  in helping the Greek king, George II, escape 
to Egypt was also given prominence in the official history. A later battle fought jointly by 
Greeks and New Zealanders in Rimini in September 1944 was hailed in the New Zealand press 
as “an historic occasion”, “a reminder of the heroic days of gallant action in Greece and Crete” 
(134). 
 
Such selective highlighting served to bolster morale but was often at odds with conditions on 
the ground. The Greek king, for example, was a contentious figure, mistrusted by the majority 
of the Greek population for his pre-war collaboration with the fascist government of Ioannis 
Metaxas. Republican sentiment dominated in the country, but Churchill and Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden had other ideas, stemming from a personal loyalty to the king as well as an aim 
to use him to further British interests in the Mediterranean after the war. British support for the 
monarchical government-in-exile being groomed to reinstate the king resulted in mutinies in 
the Greek forces in April 1944, and Brown records Fraser’s discomfort, expressed only in a 
mild recommendation of a stay of execution for the mutiny leaders. Like many New Zealanders 
at the time, he seems to have shared the view of Dan Davin (who had fought on Crete) that 
“Princes now are like tonsils, even if they are any good, not much use” (123). As the Germans 
withdrew and the war seemed to be nearing its end, tensions mounted over British intervention, 
particularly when a peaceful protest in Athens in December ’44 resulted in a violent police 
reaction, backed up shortly afterwards by British forces. Well aware of the dangers of civil war 
in the country, Fraser refused Churchill’s request to send troops to support British actions. 
Feelings in New Zealand were running high, initiated by the unions, Labour Party branches 
and the Communist Party of New Zealand, and the news of the British using force against such 
stalwart allies was “especially repugnant” to New Zealanders, Fraser cablegrammed London 
on 20 December 1944 (245). 
 
It is now clear that London was well aware but ignored the implications of the way the quisling 
government in Athens during the occupation was tolerant of the right-wing Security Battalions, 
who were collaborating with the German SS. Rather than being denounced and tried after 
liberation came in November ‘44, many of these individuals were incorporated into new 
government forces while those of left-wing sympathies, who had fought a determined 
resistance, were scrupulously weeded out. This bias was the cause of much political unrest in 
Greece itself. Brown doesn’t mention this here, but one New Zealander serving in Greece, John 
Mulgan, noted in a communication to Wellington that one reason the Greeks loved the New 
Zealanders was because they knew the support of this distant Pacific nation came with no 
strings attached. Britain’s insistence on restoring the monarchy came at the price of tolerance 
of fascist elements in the country. It was within this murky political environment that the seeds 
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Much of this has been reasonably well documented in both Greek and Anglophone accounts. 
Brown’s contribution is to provide examples of enlisted New Zealanders who picked up on the 
risks involved in British policy and were side-lined for their criticism. One Lieutenant-Colonel 
James Samson commanding the New Zealand Training Team in Haifa in 1942 was removed 
from his post in the training of Greek recruits on account of his opposition to British policies, 
which included a requirement to report on the political sympathies of his trainees. Demoted to 
Major, he soon returned to New Zealand. In his rebellion, Brown assesses, Samson seems to 
have had a sympathetic ear in Brigadier Alexander Falconer, commander of the huge New 
Zealand camp at Maadi on the outskirts of Cairo. But under the pressure of circumstances 
overtaking the Allies in North Africa, these untimely insurrections were quietly suppressed. 
 
To what extent then were the British to blame for the civil war that tore Greece apart in the 
years 1945-49? The Greek left by this time had certainly gained enough strength and support 
to challenge British aims. Brown hovers on the sidelines of this debate, but most recent 
historians from within Greece and beyond have agreed that the British leadership’s panicked 
reaction to the rise of the left in Greece led to a serious under-estimation of the country’s desire 
and capacity to form a broad-based democratic government with widespread popular support. 
As scholars such as Elisabeth Barker have demonstrated, the Soviets gave no indication of a 
desire to influence events in Greece,1 and the left-wing army of ELAS (Greek People’s 
Libaration Army) proved that in spite of British predictions, it had no intention of staging a 
coup in Athens after the German withdrawal. Attempts at reconciliation were made on both 
sides but in the final analysis promises were broken and the Greek monarchy was restored to 
oversee a harshly repressive right-wing regime. An internal report in New Zealand in January 
1948, as Brown records, described this regime as “exhibit[ing] features which are extremely 
repugnant to our conception of democracy” (271). 
 
But in spite of all these voices of protest from New Zealand (in the press and from government 
sources) there was a small but influential contingent of New Zealanders in Greece itself who 
toed the British line and were actively anti-ELAS. Ironically, it was their activities (though not 
their politics) which were showcased in the Official War History. An early volume of the 
history was dedicated to the topic of Special Service in Greece (1953), a 32-page booklet by 
M.B. McGlynn which championed the daring exploits of New Zealand engineers (“sappers”) 
who operated under cover in occupied Greece. Most spectacular was the demolition of two of 
the giant viaducts running along the north-south railway line, which were being used by Axis 
forces to supply Rommel’s army in North Africa. The British commander of Allied forces in 
the Middle East, Harold Alexander, had specifically requested that New Zealanders be 
involved: in this way the names of Tom Barnes, Arthur Edmonds and later Don Stott form part 
of the story of heroic resistance in wartime Greece. 
 
These SOE (Special Operations Executive) agents were instructed by their British commanders 
to keep right out of politics, but if the New Zealanders were distinguished for one thing it was 
independence of mind, an inclination to do things their own way. Brown follows the official 
history in playing up the skill and courage involved in their successful acts of sabotage, which 
are beyond dispute. But at the same time questions need to be (and have been) raised about the 
consequences of some of their personal initiatives. Barnes was a fanatical follower of Napoleon 
Zervas, the leader of the monarchy-supporting partisan group EDES (National Republican 
Greek League), even after Zervas had finally fallen out of favour with his British sponsors. 
Stott, of a similar right-wing persuasion, took it upon himself to attempt a peace negotiation 
with the German commander of the secret police in Athens, an attempt which the distinguished 
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explosive episodes of the whole war”.2 (A detailed account has been given by Hagen 
Fleischer.)3 Another SOE operative serving in the mountains on the mainland, William Jordan, 
conducted a passionate crusade in the New Zealand press against ELAS (which he called the 
“red swindle”), whose forces he claimed had willfully murdered his Hamilton friend Arthur 
Hubbard. His version of what happened appeared in his book misleadingly titled The Truth 
About Greece (Melbourne 1945); an official enquiry by a joint British and Greek team 
pronounced Hubbard’s death an accident. Brown doesn’t go into details about this, but another 
British Liaison Officer on the ground, Nicholas Hammond, himself no ELAS sympathiser, 
recorded that the findings were accepted by SOE, in spite of Churchill’s twice-repeated demand 
for retribution against ELAS.4 And while even some British sources were blaming the schism 
in the country on the Security Battalions, “who are now quite out of hand and are fully co-
operating with German SS”, Brown reveals, Jordan was justifying their actions as necessary 
self-defence against the left (233). Another lesser-known New Zealand case that Brown brings 
to light concerns Ted Aked, who remained after the German withdrawal and attached himself 
to the Greek Mountain Brigade, which had done good service in Rimini but was now dedicated 
to the task of eliminating ELAS—contrary to specific instructions given him by both Freyberg 
and Fraser. Another more high-profile New Zealander, Major-General Stephen Weir, ended up 
in early 1945 in command of the British 46th Infantry Division, whose role was to search out 
and arrest anyone of left-wing sympathies in what was at this stage effectively British-occupied 
Greece. Although Brown doesn’t put it in these terms, it could be argued that Fraser’s attempt 
to align his country with the movement towards democratic self-determination in Greece was 
seriously compromised by these individuals. 
 
Contrary to this, it has to be stressed, is the story of the many New Zealanders who did keep 
right out of politics (as far as this was possible) and simply dedicated themselves to the support 
of the partisans defending their families and villages. Arthur Edmonds, for example, in spite of 
the occasional critical comment continued to play a leading role as a British Liaison Officer 
working with ELAS.  John Mulgan, also attached to ELAS (16th and 13th Divisions) made a 
name for himself for his capacity to work alongside the partisans on equal terms, performing 
an impressive number of sabotage operations.  Other New Zealanders such as Tom Moir, Bob 
Morton, Dudley Perkins and Lou Northover either stayed on or returned after evacuation to 
continue the cause. The cold reality of what the New Zealanders suffered defending Greece is 
brought home today by the sight of cemeteries spread across the country or, equally poignant, 
the lonely slabs of stone, like that in western Crete in memory of Perkins, or that on the wind-
swept slopes of Mt Olympus commemorating John Poutu, Charlie Kaimoana and Matiu Ropata 
of the 28th Maori Battalion. 
 
Nation-building narratives will inevitably bury the dark patches and it is hardly surprising that 
it has taken over half a century for some of these details to emerge. Brown’s approach to 
conflicting accounts is to repeat at every turn that “the Greek situation defied distinct black and 
white analysis” (274), which may be true of every historical moment but hardly helps his reader 
navigate a path through his wealth of miscellaneous material. Themes include Allied war policy 
in both Britain and New Zealand, 20th-centuy Greek history, the Greek community in New 
Zealand and (in an exceptionally long and over-detailed chapter, Chapter 5) the relief programs 
to the Mediterranean country. Sometimes Brown would seem to be edging close to a thesis. An 
example here is when he states that a contemporary New Zealand novel, Martyn Uren’s They 
Will Arise: An Epic of Greece under the Axis (1945), gives a bland account of the political 
situation within the country and avoids mentioning conflict, a “denial of history” he calls 
“comical”. Britain, he adds, is treated by Uren as an “umpire with no ulterior motive” (259). 
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in supporting the vastly-numerically-inferior right-wing resistance group EDES. It’s as if he 
too, for all his evidence, is reluctant to take too provocative a stand. In this he runs counter to 
a large body of recent writing on Britain’s ill-advised involvement in wartime Greek politics. 
 
This lack of a clear political focus makes Politics of Forgetting a difficult read, not helped by 
the very short sub-sections, often only half a page long, which give a dispersed, patchwork 
effect. Based on a PhD thesis, the book also needed a thorough going-over by a copy editor to 
eliminate repetition and tidy up the grammar and syntax. This is a pity, as there is a great deal 
of interest for future scholars here. An impressive range of sources (from New Zealand in 
particular, but also from Britain and Greece) is carefully documented, and even if the author 
doesn’t always follow things up in his exposition, the comprehensive list of secondary sources 
will provide a useful resource for those wishing to do so. 
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